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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The Southern African region is today still a batt leground. In two broad interrelated 
struggles, the mass of the population of the region are ranged against the South African 
ruling class and its apartheid regime. The first of these is the advancing national liberation 
struggles inside South Africa and Namibia, led by the ANC, P A C and SWAPO. These 
struggles are assisted in the region by at tempts to co-ordinate the policies of the six African 
states grouped together as the Front l ine States - Angola, Botswana, Mozambique , 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Secondly, the region is characterized by the struggle to 
advance different processes of economic and sociaj development which are largely blocked 
by linkages between the economies of the states of ' the region and South African capitalism. 
In 1980, on the initiative of the Frontl ine States, nine Southern African states — Angola, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
— formed themselves into the Southern African P e v e l o p m e n t Co-ordination Conference 
(SADCC), whose principal objective was the extrication of its member states f rom the 
negative effects of the dominat ion of the regional economy by South African capitalism.1 
In simple terms, the issues at stake are clear. Pretoria is fighting to preserve apartheid 's 
capitalist domination, and imperialist hegemony in the sub-continent, and the people of 
Southern Africa are fighting to extricate themselves f rom capitalist exploitation and racial 
oppression. Confronted by a deep-seated crisis since the early 1970s, the racist minority 
regime has decided to regionalize apartheid and turn Southern Africa into a battlefield. It 
is within this broad f ramework that Pretoria 's strategy of regional destabilization can best 
be unders tood. 2 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DESTABILIZATION 
There are a variety of interpretat ions of the destabilization taking place in Southern Africa 
today. One view, put forward by Pretoria and some Western apologists for apartheid, sees 
the liberation movements , the Frontline States and international communism as the main 
forces of destabilization in the subcontinent. South Africa, in contrast, is viewed as a 
stabilizing force in the region. This is pure fabrication without any basis. But amongst those 
who correctly see the apartheid regime as the main agent of destabilization in Southern 
Africa there are imp2s of opinion as to whether Pretoria is the sole author of the crisis or 
whether its actions are merely part of a wider strategy of global imperialism, orchestrated 
by the US 
Broadly speaking, the dominant view at present, not only amongst the Frontl ine States but 
also among liberal critics of apartheid in the West, is that South Africa is the sole or 
1 Robert H. and Dan O'Meara. For a detailed analysis see: "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South 
African Regional Policy Since 1978", Journal of Southern African Studies, 11, No. 2 (1985). 
2 Ajulu, R.O.K., "South Africa's Strategy of Destabilisation: The Case of Lesotho" in Michael Sefali and John Bardill, 
Development and Destabilisation in Southern Africa, Southern African Series, No. 3: Institute of Southern African Studies, 
1985, p.119. 
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principal architect of destabilization, although it clearly draws support f rom the West and 
particularly from the US. The strategic implications of this view are clear. American and 
other Western leaders must be persuaded to stop their support for South Africa. The 
si tuat ion in Southern Africa would then hopefully change. This is the underlying 
assumption behind s tatements by liberation movement leaders of South Africa and 
Namibia and also by leaders of the Frontl ine States. 
The same sort of assumptions are shared by a number of well-meaning Americans who 
think the US can be persuaded to delink itself f rom South Africa, for in their view it is 
politically immoral to support apartheid. The second view, which sees destabilization not 
as a South African initiative, but as part of a much wider strategy of international 
imperialism, has been argued forcibly by some people. They argue that the struggle in 
Southern Africa is the struggle against the plans of international imperialism and the global 
strategy of the United States. This conceptualization of the Southern African situation has 
radically different strategic implications f rom the first view. For if destabilization and other 
actions by South Africa are the initiatives not just of South Africa but of a global imperialist 
strategy it would be an illusion to think that the US can disassociate itself f rom South Africa 
simply because it finds apartheid morally repugnant. It would, therefore , be wrong to 
personalize US foreign policy as if it were the brainchild of "reactionary" or "misguided" 
US officials. Strategically, the liberation movements and the Frontl ine States, according 
to this view, would have to stop counting on the US and concentrate instead on ways in 
which the l iberation struggle could be waged by the people themselves. 
As things are at the moment , it would appear that the second view is the most realistic. 
This is not to say, of course, that every act of banditry or sabotage by South Africa must 
have the prior approval of the US State Depar tment . Within the broad US global strategy, 
South Africa, like Israel and other countries, has a degree of relative autonomy. But the 
broad dimensions of Pretoria 's policy in Southern Africa cannot be de termined by South 
Africa on its own. Consultations go on all the t ime between the US and South Africa at 
various levels, official and unofficial, at inter-government meetings and in the boardrooms 
of corporations. It is at such meetings that the broad outlines of South Africa 's Southern 
African strategy are planned and fashioned. 
DESTABILIZATION AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE STATUS QUO IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 
In order for the Uni ted States and South Africa to maintain the status quo in Southern 
Africa, they have been indulging in the following activities. These acts of aggression will 
be expanded upon as the paper unfolds by giving concrete examples: 
• Building South Africa's economic and military power. 
• Instituting a p rogramme of reforms within South Africa which would remove "petty 
apartheid" and polish the rough edges of its segregationist social policy. 
• Maintaining a total control over the movement of the black population. 
• Isolating the more liberal whites who favour negotiations with Africans. 
• Isolating the black population by integrating the other communit ies - e.g. the 
Coloureds and Indians — into decision-making structures, admittedly as junior 
partners. 
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® Keeping the liberation movements weak, divided and suppressed. 
• Preventing the liberation movements f rom operating freely f rom neighbouring 
independent African states. 
• Infiltrating the military and security organizations of the Frontl ine States. 
• Encouraging opposition to the governments of the Frontl ine States by giving support 
to dissidents. 
• Intimidating neighbouring countries through acts of sabotage and other actions so 
that they recognize the reality of South African power and are afraid to give support 
to South African liberation movements . 
• Preventing neighbouring countries f rom uniting into a common front against South 
Africa. 
• Keeping neighbouring states (and especially Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) 
economically weak and dependent on South Africa, and ensure that S A D C C does 
not become a viable economic grouping. 
• Preventing Namibia 's independence for as long as possible, by insisting on discussing 
irrelevant issues. 
• Keeping in overall control of the situation, so that should change within South Africa 
become unavoidable the US can step in as an "honest broker" to work out a set t lement 
that would preserve white settler interests in South Africa and protect the wider 
economic and strategic interests of Western imperialism.3 
THE EMERGENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY OF DESTABILIZATION 
In the last few years South Africa's destabilization policy has received increasing attention 
and so there might be the impression that the apartheid state's destabilization policy is of 
recent veritage. In fact, the destabilization policy is at least 10 years old, if one takes note 
of Pre tor ia ' s 1975-76 invasion debacle in Angola when it, together with the USA, 
unsuccessfully tried to defeat the MPLA and ensure a U N I T A / F N L A government in 
Angola by the t ime of Angola 's independence in November 1975. Further , if one takes into 
account Pretoria 's economic, political and military support of rebel Rhodesia , its illegal 
occupation of Namibia (in which South Africa's mandate was terminated by the UN 
Genera l Assembly in 1966, where South Africa was proclaimed to be in illegal occupation 
by the U N Security Council in 1969, and the International Court of Justice declared South 
Africa to be in illegal occupation of Namibia and confirmed the Security Council 's 1969 call 
for its withdrawal), then clearly South Africa's regional destabilization policy goes back to 
3 The conceptualisation of destabilisation and the conditions under which the U.S.A. and South Africa can maintain the 
status quo in Southern Africa are based on Yash Tandon's contribution, "South Africa's Strategy of Regional 
Destabilisation", in Michael Sefali and John Bardill, Development and Destabilisation in Southern Africa, pp.59-75, op. 
cit. 
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the mid-1960s. But it goes back even fur ther in time if one takes a continental view of 
destabilization, because of South Africa 's military and economic support of the Tshombe 
secession in Katanga in 1961 which line of action continued with support for the Biafra 
secession during 1967-70.4 But Ibbo Mandaza observes that destabilization in Africa started 
at the Berlin Conference of 1884 when the European imperialist countries divided Africa 
amongst themselves.5 
THE APARTHEID STATE IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION 
The interventions by the apartheid state in the Southern African region — in the form of 
mi l i ta ry incurs ions , assass ina t ions , e c o n o m i c des tab i l i za t ion , o f f e r s of e conomic 
"co-operation" through a "constellation of states", and proposed land cessions — are a large 
part of the daily news of this region. ' Yet they should all be seen as particular tactics in a 
relatively coherent regional strategy developed under the Botha regime. In part, this 
should be unders tood as an aspect of the Total Strategy of the regime, and in part in the 
context of the history and specific dynamic of regional policy. 
CONDITIONS GIVING RISE TO THE TOTAL STRATEGY 
From 1978 to 1984 South Africa 's domestic and regional policies were consistently oriented 
towards a coherent strategic vision of the conditions necessary to ensure the survival of 
apartheid. Known as the Total Strategy this involved a complex mix of domestic "reform" 
and regional intervention. Clearly the Total Strategy was a direct response to four 
developments of the early 1970s: 
• The re-emergence, af ter nearly a decade of political quiescence, of the new forms of 
organised, large-scale black opposition. The bloody suppression of the 1976 Soweto 
uprising clearly indicated that the apartheid state could not continue in the old way 
and that some form of change was essential to its survival. 
• T h e onset of a deep recession. All the leading business people insisted that the easing 
of restrictions on the mobility and training of black labour, in order to permit its more 
productive employment in more highly capital intensive forms of production, was 
essential to any economic recovery. 
• T h e de fea t of Por tuguese colonial ism and the i n d e p e n d e n c e of Angola and 
Mozambique under socialist governments, followed by the debacle of the first South 
Afr ican invasion of Angola in 1975-76, the humiliating withdrawal of the South 
4 Patel, H.H., "South Africa's Deslabilisation Policy", Review of International Affairs, October 20, 1986, Belgrade, p.8. 
5 This observation was made by Mandaza at the "Conference on Regional Security in Southern Africa", University of 
Zimbabwe, June 8-10,1987. 
6 R. Davies, D. O 'Meara and S. Dhlamini, op. cit. p.42. See also Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds.), Destructive 
Engagement (Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1986), p.43. 
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African army and the collapse of Pretoria 's "detente" initiative, a'l showed the need 
for a new vision of South Africa 's regional role. 
• T h e growing international condemnat ion of South Africa and its isolation f rom its 
major allies, embodied in the US vote for a mandatory arms embargo and demand 
for "one person, one vote" in 1977, together with the growing threat of sanctions 
showed the need for a dramatic improvement in image. 
In 1977, the Depar tment of Defence had argued that South Africa faced a "total onslaught". 
It advocated the mobilization of the full range of resources at the disposal of the state in 
order to preserve the "free enterprise system".8 
This was the Total Strategy, and it was a strategic shift away from the cruder forms of 
apartheid. It sought to restructure specific aspects of apartheid capitalism in order to 
preserve its basic parameters, to defuse developing mass unrest, and to reduce South 
Africa 's international isolation. And the Total Strategy had both domestic and regional 
components . 
The regional component of the Total Strategy rested on an at tempt to internationalize the 
problems confront ing the apartheid state. Its strategists argued that the source of instability 
and conflict, both within South Africa and across the entire region, was nei ther apartheid 
nor colonialism but external intervention. Elabora te theories of a "total onslaught" against 
South Africa, orchestrated by the Soviet Union but sometimes including the Carter 
Administrat ion and the CIA, were proposed. 
The fundamenta l objective of South African policy was now defined as the creation of a 
Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). Recognizing that apartheid was a 
barrier to formal alliances with neighbouring states, part of this tactic involved raising the 
spectre of "Marxism" in order to generate a counter-strategy. Pretoria argued therefore 
that all the states in the region faced a common "Marxist" enemy, and that they could not 
rely on the Western powers for support. It proposed "regional solutions" to this allegedly 
"regional problem". By so doing, South Africa hoped that its international isolation could 
be eroded through a transformation of regional relations. 
Over and above its primary objective of forging a "Constellation of Southern African States" 
the Total Strategy pursued five related regional objectives. In brief, these are: 
• Ensuring that neighbouring states would refrain f rom actively supporting the armed 
struggles led by S W A P O in Namibia and the A N C in South Africa, and obliging them 
to act as virtual policing agents for South Africa, by prohibiting political activity by 
South African and Namibian refugees in their territory. 
• Ensuring that "Soviet-bloc powers" (including Cuba) would gain neither a political 
nor military foothold anywhere in the region. Pretoria objected even to any state 
establishing normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 
• Strengthening existing regional ties, as noted above. 
7 Dan O'Meara, "Destabilisation in Southern Africa: Total Strategy in Total Disarray", Monthly Review, April 1986, 
pp.52-53 
8 "White Paper on Defence", Department of Defence, Cape Town, 1977. 
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• Ensuring that "black states" in the region would not support calls for mandatory 
sanctions against South Africa and that they shield South Africa from any such 
sanctions. 
• Inducing moderat ion in the "heady anti-South African rhetoric" of the region." 
CONSAS COLLAPSES 
Botha 's dream of CONSAS was naive, because it was built on two false assumptions: first, 
that Muzorewa would win the elections in Zimbabwe, and, second, that the majority-ruled 
neighbouring State shared the fear of a communist onslaught. 
We would note here that Z imbabwe was the keystone to any regional grouping. The 
Front l ine States (FLS) and Botha's apartheid regime unveiled their plans in 1979 on the 
assumption that their side would win in Zimbabwe. The first shock to Pretoria was the 
massive Z A N U - P F victory in Zimbabwe on March 41980. On April 1 Rober t Mugabe took 
Z imbabwe into FLS and S A D C C rather than CONSAS. The second shock was when all 
three other non-FLS members also joined SADCC. This meant that apartheid was seen 
as more evil than socialism. 
Lesotho, although totally surrounded by South Africa, had been moving steadily away from 
it politically. For example, in 1978, Lesotho hosted a UN anti-apartheid seminar and 
opened warm relations with Mozambique. Malawi, the only majority-ruled state in Africa 
to have diplomatic links with Pretoria, had sharply cut the number of migrant miners going 
to South Africa, reduced its purchases from South Africa ( f rom 41% of total imports in 1979 
to 3 2 % in 1981), and was quietly building bet ter links with its neighbours. 
Swaziland, too, was moving away; it gave tacit agreement for A N C guerillas to pass from 
Mozambique through Swaziland to South Africa, and became more critical of apartheid. 
On April 6 1981 it hosted a meeting of the heads of Mozambique, Botswana and Lesotho 
which issued a communique denouncing "attempts by South Africa to destabilize her 
neighbouring black-ruled states".10 
Thus none of the neighbouring states was willing to be seen consorting with apartheid and 
the bantustans, and all supported delinking. With its CONSAS plans undermined, the 
apartheid regime appeared unsure of its immediate regional objectives, and during the 
second phase — f rom mid-1980 to the end of 1981 - it lashed out in a fairly indiscriminate 
way. Direct military action, and direct aggression through puppet groups, was taken against 
Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. In Namibia, a "dual-track" strategy sought 
to build the "internal sett lement" under the DTA, while escalating military attacks against 
S W A P O bases in Angola in order to weaken it militarily and politically. 
Compared with what was to follow, however, the destabilization measures taken up until 
the end of 1981 were relatively mild. By early 1982 Pretoria seemed to have recovered from 
the "loss of Rhodesia" and had worked out its immediate regional objectives more precisely. 
9 Dan O'Meara, op. cit. pp.55-56 
10 Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front, South Africa's War Against Its Neighbours, (The Chaucer Press, Suffolk, 1986), 
p.39. 
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South Africa now divided the states of the region into three broad categories and used a 
different mix of tactics against each. More conservative states, such as Swaziland and 
Malawi, were seen as real or potential collaborators and offered concessions in order to 
encourage them to strengthen their ties with Pretoria, or as rewards for "good behaviour". 
The second category of regional states identified by Pretoria were those considered 
unfriendly to South Africa but vulnerable to pressure, such as Lesotho and Zimbabwe. The 
third encompassed those whose political system and development strategies were seen as 
a direct threat to Pretoria 's interests, particularly Mozambique and Angola. Both groups 
were singled out for intensified and sustained military and economic destabilization.1 1 
Limitations of space prohibit a discussion of the sustained and vicious assault on the 
countries of Southern Africa that has taken place f rom mid-1980 up to the present moment . 
We shall, therefore , confine ourselves to the Zimbabwe Experience as an example. 
Destabil ization represents the "outward move" of the militarized state even while it 
c o n t i n u e s to s u p p r e s s and o p p r e s s t he ma jo r i t y of Sou th A f r i c a n s and i n d e e d 
destabilization is the perfect linkage between the apartheid state's domestic and foreign 
policies.1 2 
THE ZIMBABWE EXPERIENCE 
At the centre of the region, both politically and geographically, Z imbabwe was the biggest 
threat to South African hegemony. Rober t Mugabe 's joint policies of socialism and 
reconciliation raised the threat of a prosperous multiracial state which would challenge 
South Africa 's apartheid policy. Zimbabwe is also critical to S A D C C because it is literally 
the hub of regional transport and would thus be central in re-directing traffic away from 
South Africa. 
In order to prevent the Southern African states f rom becoming economically independent 
f rom South Africa, the apartheid regime used some of the following methods in brief to 
destabilize Zimbabwe. 
• disinformation (e.g. hundreds of letters and ant i -Government leaflets were sent to 
Z imbabwe in 1983 and 1984) 
• long-term invasion/occupation (e.g. Namibia since 1966 and Angola since 1975-76) 
• a t t empted assassinations of the Pr ime Minister and senior Government /Par ty 
members (e.g. December 18 1981 bomb attack on Z A N U - P F H Q in Hara re ) 
• assassinations/murders of liberation movement leaders and other personnel (e.g. 
Maseru, Harare , Maputo, Lusaka, Gaborone during 1981-1983) 
• attacks on oil installations and routes (e.g. in Mozambique, Angola and Lesotho since 
1980) 
• attacks on military installations (e.g. Inkomo Barracks and Thornhill Air Base in 
Z imbabwe August 16,1981 and July 25,1982 respectively) 
11 Dan O'Meara, op. cit., pp.58-9. 
12 Patel, H.H., op. cit., p.9. 
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• training, supplying, directing surrogate armies in neighbouring states (e.g. UN1TA 
in Angola, M N R in Mozambique, LLA in Lesotho and S u p e r - Z A P U in Zimbabwe) 
• attacks on transport routes (e.g. closures of the Benguela Railway in Angola, the 
Z imbabwe-Mapu to line, the Malawi-Nacala line, the Malawi-Beira line, and attacks 
on the Zimbabwe-Beira road/rail line, during 1975-1980) 
• p o r t / b o r d e r inspect ion of cargo, ha rassment of t ranspor t pe rsonne l (e.g. for 
Z imbabwe and Zambia 1986) 
• l imiting the use of South Afr ican railways, for example by manipulat ing the 
availability of railway wagons (done to Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia) 
• res t r ic t ions on migrant labour (done to all i m m e d i a t e ne ighbours : Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique) 
• curbing imports f rom neighbouring states (done to Z imbabwe and Swaziland) 
• regulating the export of goods to black states, especially "food and oil" (done to 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Z imbabwe) 
• restricting South African tourists (done to Lesotho and Swaziland) 
• violating the Customs Union agreement (done to all three other members : Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland)1 3 
Details of Selected Incidents Mentioned Above: 
• The first incident occurred on August 3 1981. Joe Gqabi , representat ive of the A N C 
in Zimbabwe, was assassinated outside his Hara re house. The murder weapon was 
never found. Later it emerged that Gqabi had been targeted by the South Africans 
and el iminated by a squad sent into Z imbabwe to do the job. 
• T h e next incident in the sequence occurred on August 16 1981. A series of massive 
explosions r ipped through the armoury at Inkomo Barracks near Hara re destroying 
$36 million worth of armaments . This was done by South Afr ican agents. 
• On D e c e m b e r 18 1981, a 10-15 kg bomb exploded on the roof of the Z A N U - P F 
Headquar te r s at 88 Manica Road, Harare . This was aimed at the Z A N U leadership. 
• On July 23 1982, six tourists - two Americans, two Australians and two Britons — 
were abducted by bandits on the road f rom Bulawayo to Victoria Falls. This was to 
unde rmine Zimbabwe 's tourist industry. 
• Two days later, July 25, a quar ter of Z imbabwe 's air force planes were sabotaged on 
the ground at the Thornhill base near Gweru in the centre of the country by South 
Africa. 
• Intelligence analysis around 1982 defined the strategic intentions of the bandits in 
three phases. The first phase was to recover cached weapons not yet located by the 
Government , and to train and arm recruits. Phase two was to attack isolated 
economic targets such as white commercial farms, stores, etc. Phase three was to 
13 Ibid., p.9. 
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attack police stations, army posts and security force patrols with the objective of 
making Matabeleland ungovernable. All this had the support of South Africa. 
• Two other weapons, non-lethal but nevertheless destabilizing, which South Africa 
uses against Z imbabwe are propaganda and disinformation. Z imbabwean monitors 
first picked up a new station called Radio Truth on March 15 1983, not long after the 
South Africans were known to have become involved with Supe r -ZAPU. The new 
clandestine station broadcast initially in Ndebele and Shona at 7 a.m. and 7.30 p.m. 
daily. Recept ion was poor and a change of frequency in June brought with it the 
introduction of broadcasts in English at 6.30 a.m. and 7 p.m. But reception remained 
poor. A fur ther frequency change improved the quality of the reception of broadcasts 
in English but the reception in Ndebele and Shona remained of a poor quality. The 
transmit ter was located near Johannesburg at the Meyerton Studios of SABC. 
• T h e d i s in fo rma t ion campaign was s tepped up in 1983 a f t e r the c rea t ion of 
Supe r -ZAPU. Prominent politicians, diplomatic missions and individuals received 
a series of letters which purported to originate from a "Joe Moyo", said to be a 
member of the Z I P R A High Command. 
• Fuel is another weapon South Africa has used to destabilize Zimbabwe. The 
rehabili tation of the Beira to Mutare oil pipeline, owned by the British transnational 
company Lonrho but closed during the U D I years, was a major post- independence 
priority. The reopening of the line was technically feasible by the end of 1981 but on 
October 29 the railway bridge over the Pungwe River, which also carries the pipeline, 
was damaged in a sabotage attack and the road bridge was totally destroyed. In 
December 1982 Zimbabwe suffered an acute fuel shortage which almost brought the 
country to a standstill and resulted in queues at petrol stations that stretched for 
several kilometres. 
• The cheapest route to the sea for Zimbabwe is through Chicualacuala, in the extreme 
south-east, to Maputo. This was subjected to continuous attacks until the MNR 
closed it down completely on August 20 1984. Thus, through its surrogates and 
through direct action, Pretoria forced Zimbabwe and other landlocked countries to 
return to almost total dependence on South Africa 's trade routes. But Zimbabwe 's 
response in committ ing troops to secure the Beira route obviously surprised Pretoria. 
And in the second half of 1985, faced with the prospect of the Chicualacuala route 
reopening by mid-1986 if security improved along the line, South Africa introduced 
a new tactic. This was a two-tier tariff s tructure offering lower contract rates than 
those published. The new contract rates undercut the previous Chicualacuala 
charges on four of Zimbabwe 's main bulk exports — asbestos, tobacco, fe r rochrome 
and steel. T h e message was obvious. Even if Chicualacuala was reopened it would 
be more costly to return to the traditional Mozambique routes than to use South 
Africa. Not only was it a way of fur ther destabilizing Mozambique by denying it 
foreign currency earnings but it also exerted pressure on the Mugabe government. 
• The vulnerability of Zimbabwe and other landlocked countries in the region was 
fur ther demonstra ted within a year of independence. First, South African Railways 
began to extend the turnaround time for railway wagons, claiming there was excessive 
demand for rail transport. Loadings per day, particularly of diesel tankers, were 
reduced. Then in April 1981, South Africa withdrew 25 locomotives loaned to the 
previous government of Rhodesia. It did this on so little notice that the Zimbabwe 
transport network was under severe strain for some time, forcing the loss of orders 
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and stockpiling of maize, steel and sugar for several weeks. Lost export earnings were 
est imated at $7 million a week. 1 4 
• South Africa 's destabilization in the first six years of independence cost Zimbabwe 
millions of dollars in additional import and export tariffs, lost orders, property 
destroyed by bandits, discouraged investment and tourism. Beyond that there was 
the cost of military operat ions against the bandits at home, the cost of guarding the 
Beira route and in July 1985, the deployment of fighting units in a joint offensive 
against the M N R . 
• The latest is that an M N R contingent of armed rebels crossed into Z imbabwe just 
north of the border village of Cashel at around midnight on Thursday November 12, 
1987. T h e following day, Friday November 13, a large number , perhaps 70, scaled the 
security fence of the compound at Nyambeya Forestry estate, some five kilometres 
inside Zimbabwe. Smashing windows and doors, and assaulting the workers and their 
families with pangas, knives and bayonets, the rebels lustily gathered food, clothing, 
watches and radios into 50 kg bags and absconded with 20 people acting as porters, 
including three women and a three-year-old child. The South African-backed M N R 
rebels have been sneaking into the Chiredzi District of Masvingo Province where 
they have been committ ing atrocities among some local Z imbabwean civilians during 
the past few months. 
• For example, on September 9, 1987, a gang of 10 rebels murdered four people at 
Musumeki Village, about 160 km south of Chiredzi town in Sengwe Communal 
Lands. The gang set alight four caterpillar tractors belonging to the Ministry of 
Transpor t and also set fire to a grinding mill at Musukwe store. The following day 
(September 10) a child f rom the same village died after detonating an anti-personnel 
mine. On October 23,1987 the bandits attacked Ndali Business Centre , about 71 km 
east of Chiredzi town. Six people were killed. The rebels burnt down a local clinic, 
two grinding mills and five stores they had looted.1 5 
• The story behind these bandits now, according to the former Lisbon spokesman for 
the M N R bandits, Paulo Oliveira, is that there is a clash of interests surrounding 
control over the bandits. H e said that a "Washington-Paris axis" is trying to break the 
monopoly control exercised over the M N R by the South Africans and by the 
"Pretoria-Bonn axis". Oliveira fur ther maintains that support f rom the Uni ted States 
comes f rom private rightwing institutions such as the Heri tage Foundat ion and "Free 
the Eagle", and f rom individuals such as T o m Schaaf who appeared in Washington 
in 1985 as an M N R representative after being in Zimbabwe and passing through 
Lisbon.1 6 
Destabilization Damage in Monetary Terms 
Of the S A D C C countries, Angola and Tanzania are the least economically dependent on 
South Africa. All other members of the regional organisation are heavily or totally reliant 
14 P. Johnson and D. Martin, op. cit., Chap. 2, pp.43-72. 
15 Sam Mushukuto, MOTO, December 1987, January 1988, p. 13. 
16 The Herald, Zimbabwe, March 26,1988. 
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o n S o u t h A f r i c a n d i s t r i b u t i o n r o u t e s , d u e to t h e o b s o l e t e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and 
communica t ion ne twork inher i ted f rom colonial t imes. This si tuat ion, coupled with South 
Afr ican military attacks, especially against Angola, has resul ted in approximate ly US$20 
million in d a m a g e to S A D C C m e m b e r countr ies in the past 10 years. Accord ing to an 
S A D C C study, d a m a g e amoun ted to US$11,36 bill ion in the 1980-84 per iod a lone. Costs 
inflicted on S A D C C m e m b e r countr ies through a combina t ion of economic pressure and 
military aggression on the par t of South Afr ica in the past few years include: 
• increased military expendi tures : US$3,6 billion 
• higher t ranspor ta t ion and energy costs: US$193 million 
• r e fugee relief: US$750 million 
• losses f r o m a decl ine in exports and tourism: US$261 million 
• losses f r o m t rade embargoes : US$295 million 
• losses f r o m reduced economic growth: US$2,27 billion 
• con t raband and sabotage: US$215 million 
This adds up to approximately US$7 billion, or the equivalent of the combined 1980 export 
revenues of the nine S A D C C m e m b e r countr ies . Addi t ional d a m a g e in the amoun t of 
US$4 billion has b e e n caused by South Afr ican military invasions in the past few years. 
This f igure does not include some US$20 billion in damage suf fered by Angola resulting 
f rom repea ted South Afr ican raids since it became independen t in 1975. 
Sabotage a lone has caused Angolans the equivalent of seven t imes the total value of the 
country 's 1980 exports. It is es t imated that a full one-sixth of the combined value of S A D C C 
m e m b e r s ' foreign t rade was lost in 1980-86 as a result of South Afr ican aggression. 
Yet, if the past seven years have been extremely difficult for South Afr ica 's neighbours , the 
near f u t u r e looks even b leaker . As the whi te minori ty gove rnmen t feels th rea tened by 
world publ ic op in ion it is even m o r e willing to use its full economic weight against S A D C C 
m e m b e r s as par t of its ca t -and-mouse game . 1 7 
CONCLUSION 
T h e last two decades have seen the rapid growth and expansion of counter- revolut ionary 
forces in Sou the rn Afr ica . T h e counter- revolut ion is mainly di rected against progressive 
states with the aim of disrupt ing their progressive economies , impair ing their ability to 
govern, and thereby neutral is ing their support for the l iberat ion struggle in Namibia and 
South Afr ica and impeding the implementa t ion of socialism. 
Za i r e and South Afr ica , two of the major states in the region, are actively involved in this 
counter - revolut ion , e i ther directly or through assistance to the rebel bands of U N I T A , 
R E N A M O and o ther rightwing dissidents. They do so with the full backing of the Uni ted 
States of Amer ica , whose policy of constructive engagement seeks co-opera t ion with South 
Afr ica to check what U S pol icymakers see as Soviet expansionism in Afr ica and to prevent 
17 This evaluation of damage is based on Carlos Castilho, Africa, No. 4, October/November 1986, p.39. 
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any socialist experiment f rom succeeding in this strategically important region of the world 
capital economy. This is the context in which to explain US support for UNITA, including 
the supply to the latter of the sophisticated Stinger anti-aircraft missiles through Zaire. For 
these missiles are meant to ensure the strategic balance in favour of South Africa, by giving 
it greater advantage in the air so it can cripple Angola 's economy and society. 1 
Apartheid is, therefore , the root cause of conflict in the region of Southern Africa which 
has already jeopardized the peace and security of the sub-continent, and which poses a 
grave threat to international peace and security. The p r e p a r a t i o n ^ g e n o c i d e at home, and 
the practice of aggression and terrorism abroad are inherent in the system of apartheid. 
The re can, therefore , be no peace, stability or security in Southern Africa until the 
obnoxious system is completely eradicated. Only the complete e l iminat ion of the 
abominable and criminal system of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial, 
democrat ic society in a unitary South Africa can constitute a sound basis for a just, lasting 
and universally accepted solution to the problem. 
The international community must take concrete and substantive steps to compel the racist 
South African regime to abandon forthwith its reprehensive policy of apartheid. 1" 
The demand for sanctions must be viewed in the context of both destabilization and 
Western support for the apartheid regime. Those opposed to sanctions argue that they will 
hurt the neighbouring states. Undoubtedly, this is true. But if it accelerates the downfall 
of apartheid, it would be well worth the additional cost. 
The re is no doubt that if comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions are imposed by 
the i n t e rna t i ona l communi ty , par t icular ly the ma jo r imper ia l i s t coun t r i e s whose 
investments and trade relations form the basis of the South African economy, the South 
African regime will not be able to rule in the old way. The basic problem, however, is that 
precisely because the world imperialist system has apartheid South Africa as its integral 
and very profi table part, the efficacy of the weapon of sanctions is doubtful or will be 
marginal at the very best. Of course, apartheid can be made unprof i table and unworkable 
by revolutionary mass action and armed struggle in which case imperialist monopolies will 
pull out, but not as part of the international effort based on the principle of national and 
social emancipat ion in South Africa. Already a number of monopolies such as Bata, IBM, 
Genera l Motors, Genera l Electric, Coca-Cola, Honeywell, Barclays Bank, Kodak and 
others are designing modalities for disinvesting without losing out by transferring their 
exploitative capital to all manner of institutional devices. This goes to underl ine the fact 
that sanctions can accelerate the process of dismantling apartheid and enhancing the 
process of national and social liberation in South Africa and Namibia. Sanctions are, 
therefore, important but they are not the only way in which the backbone of imperialist 
monopoly capital that nurtures apartheid fascism can be broken 2 0 
The imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions on apartheid South Africa would 
enlarge the prospect of an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in 
South Africa and peace and stability in the Southern African region as a whole. 
18 Editorial in Southern African Political and Economic Monthly, March 1988. 
19 See the Political Declaration of the Non-Aligned Countries, Harare, September 1-6, 1986. 
20 This assessment of the impact of sanctions on South Africa shared by many people was expressed at the "Seminar on 
Southern African Response to Imperialism", University of Zimbabwe, April 22-24, 1987 by S. Gutto, B. Hlatshwayo, S. 
Nzombe; "Sanctions and the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa: Theses and Antitheses of Imperialism", p.5. 
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